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Abstract
Since its introduction in 1997, the leniency program has played an important role in Korea 
in detecting cartel activities that have the clandestine nature.  Recently, however, its operation 
by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter KFTC) gave rise to criticism among 
companies and practitioners, ranging from doubts over the leniency regime’s reliability or 
transparency to the fundamental skepticism over whether or why the leniency program itself 
should exist. Such criticism got intensified as statements submitted by leniency applicants have 
been dismissed in a number of recent cartel cases.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny the efficacy of the leniency program, not only in 
detecting existing cartels but also in deterring future cartel activities. For this reason, the 
leniency program is indispensable for the KFTC to facilitate its investigation of cartels, which 
are by nature secretive. Therefore, the KFTC should continue its effort to beef up the leniency 
program by actively addressing practical issues that have been raised during the implementation 
and operation of the current leniency program.
Against this backdrop, this article analyzes some practical key issues raised by the 
companies, the academia, and practitioners in the course of the KFTC’s implementation of the 
leniency program, including such issues as the reliability of leniency applicants and the 
interpretation of key leniency requirements such as degree of necessary evidence, termination of 
cartel activities, coercion, and the scope of continued and sincere cooperation. It also touches 
upon issues related to restricting leniency immunity against repeat offenders, joint leniency 
application and protecting identity of leniency applicants. 
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I. Introduction
Unfair concerted conduct, also known as cartel, refers to an 
anticompetitive act where two or more competitors conspire to manipulate 
competitive factors such as prices, terms and conditions, quantities, 
counterparties or districts of transactions for their common goods or 
services in order to restrain competition and maximize their profits. 
Prohibited in Korea by Article 19 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act (hereinafter MRFTA), unfair concerted conduct can be penalized 
by administrative sanctions such as corrective orders (MRFTA Article 21) 
and administrative fines (MRFTA Article 22), as well as criminal 
punishment.1) 
The clandestine nature of cartel makes it difficult for competition 
authorities and the Prosecutor’s Office to detect, and even if finally 
detected, collecting sufficient evidence to prove unlawful wrongdoings 
becomes a daunting task in practice.2) This explains why competition 
agencies are increasingly depending on leniency programs to identify 
cartels. 
The leniency program offers a company involved in a cartel an 
exemption or reduction related to corrective orders or administrative fines 
if the company cooperates with the authority by, for example, voluntarily 
reporting its involvement in the cartel and providing evidence (MRFTA 
Article 22-2). In these days when cartels develop to be more hidden and 
pervasive, the leniency program intends not only to identify an increasing 
number of cartel activities but also to effectively cause cartels to collapse 
and preempt their formation by providing incentives for whistleblowers to 
self-report and thereby undermining trust among cartel members.3) 
After several reforms following its introduction in 1997, the leniency 
1) Corporates are subject to a criminal fine of up to 200 million Korean won. Individuals 
are subject to imprisonment of up to three years or a criminal fine up to 200 million Korean 
won, or both. See MRFTA Article 66, paragraph 1.
2) Kim Hyeong Wook, Kaleutel Jajinsingo Gammyeonjedoe Gwanhan Yeongu [A Study on 
Cartel Leniency Program], 21 Hyeongsabeobui sindongHyang [neW Trends in Crim. L.] 152, 154 
(2009).
3) Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2014 Korea Fair Trade WHiTe PaPer 170-171 (2014). 
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program has developed into one of the most important and effective 
measures to identify cartel activities in Korea. From 1999 to 2013, the 
leniency has been applied in 141 out of 325 cartel cases on which 
administrative fines are imposed, representing 43.4% of the total cases. 
Reliance on the leniency program is on the rise, with 55.2% of the cases on 
which administrative fines are imposed identified through leniency 
application from 2005 to 2013.4)  
While the effectiveness of leniency program in detecting and deterring 
cartels, along with its role in improving cartel enforcement, has been well 
substantiated,5) its implementation also gave rise to criticisms among 
practitioners and the academia over how it should be improved to address 
several practical issues.6) In particular, some skeptics went so far as to 
threaten the foundation of the leniency program, arguing that it should be 
significantly redesigned based on the Constitutional principle of due 
process of law because the current regime does not protect innocent 
companies from misleading or false leniency application, leaving them 
exposed to reputational damage and financial loss.7)
Against this backdrop, this article analyzes primary issues identified in 
the course of implementing leniency programs by the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (hereinafter KFTC) and sets forth recommendations for 
improvement to address them. 
4) Id.
5) See Kim Hyeon Soo & Nahm Jae Hyun, Kaleutel Jajinsingoja Gammyeonjedoui Juyo 
Jaengjeomgwa Hyogwabunseog [Several Topics in Cartel Leniency Program Implementation], 12(2) 
eungyonggyeongje [aPPLied eConomiCs] 21 (2010). 
6) See Yun Seong Un & Song Joon Hyeon, Budanghan Gongdonghaengwi Jajinsingoja 
Gammyeonjedoui Silmu Unyongsang Jemunje [Practical Issues of the Current Leniency Program], 20 
gyeongjaengbeobyeongu [j. Kor. ComPeTiTion L.] 263 (2009); Hwang Tae Hee, Hyeonhaeng 
Kaleutel Jajinsingoja Gammyeonjedoui Munjejeomgwa Gaeseonbangan [A Study on the Current 
Leniency Program in Korea], 16 gyeongjaengbeobyeongu [j. Kor. ComPeTiTion L.] 71 (2007); Park 
Sung Bom, Hyeonhaeng Budanghan Gongdonghaengwi Jajinsingo Jedoui Munjejeomgwa 
Gaeseonbangan [Problems and Recommendations Regarding Current Cartel Leniency Programs for 
Unfair Concerted Conduct], 26 gyeongjaengbeobyeongu [j. Kor. ComPeTiTion L.] 3 (2012).
7) Seo Jeong, Jeogbeobjeolcha Wonlie Bichueo Bon Hyeonhaeng Jajinsingoja Gammyeonjedoui 
Munjejeomgwa Gaeseonbangan [Incentives to Lie under the Leniency Program and Due Process], 70 
seonjin sangsa beobLyuLyeongu [advanCed CommerCiaL LaW revieW] 75, 78 (2015). 
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II. Leniency Program in Korea: Requirements and Effects
1.  First-in-Line Leniency Application Filed before the Investigation and 
Cooperation Made after the Investigation
The KFTC grants full immunity to corrective orders and administrative 
fines for the first-in-line leniency application filed before the start of an 
investigation if (i) the applicant is the first and sole party to submit 
evidence to prove the cartel activities (two or more business entities 
participating in a cartel may be granted a status of the first-in-line applicant 
by jointly submitting such evidence only if they are either (a) affiliated with 
each other under substantive control, or (b) parties to divestiture or 
business transfer if they meet other elements set forth by the KFTC); (ii) the 
application is made before the KFTC has obtained any information about 
either the cartel itself or the evidence necessary to prove the cartel activities; 
(iii) the applicant states full facts regarding the cartel activities at issue and 
makes continued and sincere cooperation such as submitting relevant 
information, among others, until the investigation is complete; and (iv) the 
applicant ceases to engage in the cartel activities. 
Once the investigation has started, the KFTC grants full immunity in 
administrative fines and an exemption or reduction in corrective orders in 
return for investigation cooperation only if it has obtained neither 
information about the cartel nor sufficient evidence to prove cartel 
activities. In principle, the KFTC will not refer the case to the Prosecutor’s 
Office for criminal prosecution if a party involved in the cartel was the first 
one to apply for a leniency or to cooperate otherwise.
2.  Second-in Line Leniency Application Filed before the Investigation and 
Cooperation Made after the Investigation
The KFTC grants fifty percent reduction in administrative fines and an 
exemption or reduction in corrective orders for the second-in-line leniency 
application filed before the start of an investigation if (i) the applicant is the 
second and sole party to submit evidence to prove the cartel activities (two 
or more business entities participating in a cartel may be granted a status of 
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the second-in-line applicant by jointly submitting such evidence only if they 
are either (a) affiliated with each other under substantive control, or (b) 
parties to divestiture or business transfer if they meet other elements set 
forth by the KFTC); (ii) the applicant states full facts regarding the cartel 
activities at issue and makes continued and sincere cooperation such as 
submitting relevant information, among others, until the investigation is 
complete; and (iii) the applicant ceases to engage in the cartel activities. 
Once the investigation has started, the KFTC offers a reduction in fines 
and an exemption or reduction in corrective orders in return for 
investigation cooperation only if it has neither obtained information about 
the cartel nor sufficient evidence to prove cartel activities. In principle, the 
KFTC will not refer the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for criminal 
prosecution if a party involved in the cartel was the second in line to apply 
for a leniency or to cooperate otherwise.
III.  Key Issues Arising from Enforcement of the Leniency 
Program
1. Reliability of Leniency Applicants
Since several administrative orders that the KFTC had imposed in 
reliance on leniency have been dismissed by the court recently, critics are 
voicing various concerns over the current leniency regime, ranging from 
doubts over the regime’s reliability or transparency to the fundamental 
skepticism over whether or why the leniency program itself should exist. 
Such criticism got intensified as statements submitted by leniency 
applicants have been dismissed in a number of recent cases. For instance, 
the KFTC concluded that there was no unlawful conduct in the packaged 
kimchi cartel case,8) the investigation of which was initiated with a leniency 
application. Similar cases include alleged collusions involving origin of oil 
8) In this price-fixing case involving four packaged kimchi manufacturers (Daesang FNF, 
CJ Cheiljedang, Pulmuone, and Dongwon F&B), two companies filed for leniency and 
conceded their wrongdoings during the proceedings. Nevertheless, the KFTC found no 
violation of the MRFTA for all the four respondents, including the leniency applicants.
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refining,9) life insurances for individuals, and beverages.
One critic shed light on a possibility that the leniency program is 
misused by applicants.10) For example, a company, after being reported and 
punished with hefty fine due to the leniency applied by its competitor, may 
be tempted to self-report another concerted conduct as a means of 
‘retaliation’, even though that case does not amount to be a cartel activity, 
or may take advantage of the leniency program merely to interfere with its 
competitors’ business.11)
In fact, while the KFTC frequently relies on statements from leniency 
applicants for imposing its sanctions, it is also true that many of such 
statements are easily adopted without strict validation of their truthfulness. 
Arguably, such lack of scrutiny is attributable to a number of factors, 
including the shortsighted, opportunistic behaviors of a leniency applicant 
eager to secure a marker for immunity, the KFTC’s lack of procedural 
capacity to screen tainted, self-serving statements of a leniency applicant, as 
well as lack of neutrality and independence of the KFTC’s proceeding 
procedures.12)
In the course of detecting and punishing cartel activities, it is extremely 
difficult to entirely disregard or neglect the critical roles served by the 
leniency program or the importance of statements from related persons, 
considering that they are used as primary evidence for cartel activities. 
Therefore, a fundamental solution to the above criticism would be to 
9) In this case, four oil refineries (SK, GS Caltex, Hyundai Oilbank, and S-Oil) had 
conspired to manage origins of oil refining by requiring gas stations to obtain the consent 
from their original oil refineries should they get oil supplies from other sources thereby 
restraining competition for attracting gas stations among themselves, and to accept to match 
quantities supplied to a gas station associated with another refinery if any of them attract that 
gas station without consent. Origin of oil refining is a concept related to the association 
relationship between a refinery and a gas station where a gas station enters a supply contract 
with an oil refinery and operates under that oil refinery’s brand. Once the supply contract is 
expired, the gas station may operate without a brand or under another brand name. For such 
gas station, the initial relationship with the old refinery becomes the origin of oil refining. The 
court found no violations of the MRFTA in an administrative action filed by SK, Hyundai 
Oilbank, and S-Oil, and dismissed the KFTC’s corrective measures and fines. 
10) Park Sung Eyup, Leniency Jedowa Gwanlyeonhan Myeoch Gaji Golyeosahang [Legal Issues 
on Leniency Program], 16 gyeongjaengbeobyeongu [j. Kor. ComPeTiTion L.] 119, 123 (2007). 
11) Id. 
12) Seo, supra note 7, at 89.
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improve the reliability and truthfulness of statements obtained through 
leniency applicants in the course of investigations and administrative 
proceedings. Accordingly, the KFTC has revised the leniency program by 
having the Commission confirm the final leniency status, which were 
previously the responsibility of the Secretary of General, and is now 
reviewing the introduction of a mandatory hearing procedure to verify the 
truthfulness of leniency applicants.
2. Interpretation of Leniency Requirements
1) ‘Necessary Evidence’ to Prove Cartel Activities
The Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA (hereinafter MRFTA 
Enforcement Decree) requires a leniency applicant to provide “evidence 
necessary to substantiate an unfair concerted conduct” as a key prerequisite 
for obtaining an immunity (MRFTA Enforcement Decree Article 25, 
paragraph 1). The KFTC has explained in its Notification on Implementation 
of Cartel Leniency Program (hereinafter KFTC Leniency Program 
Notification) that the following information constitutes necessary evidence 
for the purpose of the leniency program (hereinafter necessary 
information).
(i)    Information and/or materials that can directly verify the existence 
of agreement, such as documents on the agreement or minutes of 
the meeting, developed by and between companies that have 
participated in the cartel.
(ii)   Information and/or material describing the facts regarding 
discussion or implementation of cartel activities detailing who, 
what, when, where, why, and how, such as a testimony or statement 
from a company, including its executive or employee that has 
participated in the cartel.
(iii)  Information such as statements without being accompanies by 
detailed information that evidences related facts if it sufficiently 
acknowledges the facts related to the application.
In practice, leniency application is typically filed immediately following 
the KFTC’s dawn raid. As the KFTC may obtain information necessary to 
prove cartel activities during the dawn raid, the dawn raid serves a tipping 
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point for a company to determine whether to apply for leniency, and if 
apply, how much information it should voluntarily offer to the KFTC to 
meet the ‘necessary evidence’ test. With the KFTC’s cartel enforcement 
being strengthened, business entities forming a cartel are operating in more 
concealed, complicated, and organized manners, including the joint 
management of relevant documents, meeting minutes, and emails in 
preparation for a possible investigation. In such case, the only remaining 
evidentiary information that is available to a leniency applicant for 
submission to the KFTC is a statement or testimony of an executive or 
employee that has actually involved in the unlawful conduct. If it is not 
clear whether such statement or testimony alone may be sufficient to 
constitute necessary evidence, however, a company may hesitate to apply 
for a leniency at all in the first place.13) As a matter of fact, the KFTC 
generally requests the leniency applicant to provide supplemental 
information or documents by implying that it may be difficult to confirm 
the leniency status without additional information. 
The Supreme Court of Korea interprets the scope of ‘necessary 
evidence’ broadly. In one case, the Supreme Court held that “the ‘necessary 
evidence’ under the MRFTA Enforcement Decree means any evidence that 
can prove unfair concerted conduct either directly or indirectly (MRFTA 
Enforcement Decree Article 35, paragraph 2, subparagraph 3, item B). 
Therefore, the necessary evidence here encompasses statements as well as 
documents.” As for the interpretation of ‘necessary information’ under the 
KFTC Leniency Program Notification (Article 4, paragraph 1, subparagraph 
2), the Supreme Court has acknowledged independent admissibility of a 
statement for the purpose of confirming a leniency status. The Court held 
that “just because the Notification requires an applicant to provide 
additional documents, articles, electronic data, or telecommunication data, 
if the application submits ‘information and/or material describing the facts 
regarding discussion or implementation of cartel activities detailing who, 
what, when, where, why, and how, such as statements from a company, 
including its executive or employee that has participated in the cartel’, it 
does not mean that this provision merits or intends a different interpretation 
13) Park, supra note 6, at 8.
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of the ‘necessary evidence.’14) Furthermore, the Court took a more flexible 
approach than the KFTC in connection with the probative value of the 
statements by holding that “the probative value of the statements should be 
acknowledged not only when it reveals new facts that had not been 
identified by the KFTC by the time the submission is made, but if the 
information provided by the statements contributes to improving the 
probative value of previous information or verifying the veracity of facts 
and circumstances identified through the investigation. So far as the 
statements serves such functions, it should not be treated differently just 
because the KFTC has already obtained the information provided by such 
statements from other sources.”15) 
2) Termination of Cartel Activities
The MRFTA Enforcement Decree requires the leniency applicant to 
“cease the unfair concerted conduct” in order to obtain a leniency status 
(MRFTA Enforcement Decree Article 35, paragraph 1). The KFTC Leniency 
Program Notification provides, “whether the said unfair concerted conduct 
has been ceased shall be determined by whether the agreement for the 
cartel has continued (Article 6, paragraph 1),” and that “the said concerted 
conduct shall be ceased immediately upon the filing of the leniency 
application, provided that the conduct shall be ceased immediately after the 
grace period if the KFTC’s case examiner designates such period for the 
purpose of facilitating the investigation (Article 6, paragraph 2).”
To satisfy this requirement in practice, a leniency applicant should 
immediately cease the concerted conduct at issue expressly, by conducting 
a certain action that objectively demonstrates that the concerted conduct 
has been actually discontinued. For example, a leniency applicant for a 
price-fixing case may consider replacing a previously agreed price with a 
new one and notifying this new price to its distributors. However, such 
abrupt price change may signal to the market that this cartel participant has 
14) Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2012Du26449, June 13, 2013 (S. Kor.).
15) See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2011Nu26239, Mar. 21, 2011 (S. Kor.); The 
KFTC accommodated this ruling by amending the Leniency Program Notification (KFTC 
Notification No 2014-19, amended on January 2, 2015) accordingly. Nevertheless, at least in 
practice at the working level, it seems that requiring extra objective evidence in addition to 
statements is still not uncommon. 
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applied for a leniency, thereby making it difficult for the KFTC to 
implement follow-up investigations. Therefore, in certain circumstances, 
the KFTC may specifically request the leniency applicant to refrain from 
conducting external actions such as a price change for a certain period.
As for the interpretation of the termination of the concerted conduct, the 
Supreme Court held that “for certain companies engaging in a cartel 
activities to cease the conduct, they should take an action that contradicts 
the agreement, such as expressing their intention to disengage to other 
cartel members, either expressly or by implication, and lowering through 
independent pricing decision the prices to a level that would have been 
reached in the absence of the agreement. In order to determine whether the 
unfair concerted conduct has been ceased among all the cartel members, the 
entire business entities participating in the cartel should each engage in a 
conduct against the agreement by, for example, expressly terminating the 
agreement and lowering through independent pricing decisions the prices 
to a level that would have been reached in the absence of the agreement. 
Instead, there may exist a circumstance that is sufficient to demonstrate that 
the agreement has been de facto terminated, such as repeated price 
competition among cartel members.”16)  
The Supreme Court’s stance for termination of the concerted conduct is 
more difficult for the cartel participant to accept or implement, because in 
many cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a leniency applicant to 
restore the prices or quantities to the pre-cartel level even after it has ceased 
to engage in the cartel activities. Therefore, determining whether the 
concerted conduct has been ceased by whether the effect of the cartel 
continues, regardless of whether the actual conduct has been terminated, is 
not feasible in practice, and may have draconian implications to cartel 
participants.17)
16) See Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2007Du12774, Oct. 23, 2008 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 
2007Du12712, Nov. 27, 2008 (S. Kor.).
17) Chung Jong Chae, Dogjeomgyuje Mich Gongjeonggeolaee Gwanhan Beoblyulsang Jajinsingo 
Deung Gammyeonui Yogeon [Requirements of Cartel Leniency under the Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act], 166 gyeongjaengjeoneoL [j. ComPeTiTion] 38, 53 (2013). 
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3) Coercer Provision
The MRFTA Enforcement Decree denies an exemption or reduction of 
benefit to a leniency applicant if such applicant has coerced another 
company to join the unfair concerted conduct against its will, or forcibly 
prevent it from ceasing such conduct (MRFTA Enforcement Decree Article 
35, paragraph 1, subparagraph 5, first part).  According to the KFTC 
Leniency Program Notification, in determining whether there was a 
coercion, the KFTC shall comprehensively consider either (i) whether any 
violence or threat was exerted to force other companies to participate in 
unfair concerted conduct or prevent them from discontinuing their 
participation, or (ii) whether pressure was exerted or restriction was 
imposed to other companies to the extent to disable their normal operation 
in the market to force them to participate in unfair concerted conduct or 
prevent them from discontinuing their participation.
While the intent of these provisions to deprive the benefit of leniency 
from coercers remains valid in that allowing leniency benefit to coercers 
will frustrate the purpose of the leniency program, the vagueness of several 
concepts such as ‘pressure’ or ‘restriction’ may constrain the application of 
the coercer provisions to limited types of coercive conducts. In this regard, 
it may be necessary to introduce such concept as de facto coercion or 
broaden the definition of coercion to include intentional exercise of 
dominant market position to create a cartel structure. For example, if the 
market is comprised with one large enterprise and one small-to-medium 
enterprise, the large enterprise would be able to adopt a predatory pricing 
based on its superior financing capability, which would materially 
undermine the competitive position of the small-to-medium enterprise if its 
primary sales are generated from this market. Under this scenario, the 
small-to-medium enterprise cannot help initiating discussion over prices or 
quantities with the competing large enterprise to sustain in the market.18) 
4) Continued and Sincere Cooperation
The MRFTA Enforcement Decree requires the leniency applicant to 
“continuously make sincere cooperation with the investigation until the 
18) See also Park, supra note 6, at 15-16.
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investigation is complete by, for example fully stating all the facts in 
connection with the unfair concerted conduct and providing related 
information (MRFTA Enforcement Decree Article 35, paragraph 1).” 
According to the KFTC Leniency Program Notification, the investigation is 
complete when the deliberation by the KFTC is consummated, and whether 
the cooperation was sincere shall be determined by considering in its 
entirety: (i) whether the leniency applicant has stated without delay all the 
facts related to the unfair concerted conduct within its knowledge; (ii) 
whether all information and materials that the leniency applicant possessed 
or could collect have been promptly submitted; (iii) whether the leniency 
applicant has promptly responded to and cooperated with the KFTC’s 
requests necessary to verify facts; (iv) whether the executives and 
employees (including all former executives and employees, if applicable) 
have made their best effort to ensure continued and sincere cooperation 
through the interviews and investigations, among others, with the KFTC; 
(v) whether any evidence or information related to the unfair concerted act 
is destroyed, manipulated, damaged, or concealed by the leniency 
applicant; and (vi) whether the leniency applicant has revealed without the 
KFTC’s consent to a third party its involvement in the cartel or its 
application for leniency before the release of the Examiner’s Report (i.e., 
Statement of Objections) (KFTC Leniency Program Notification Article 5). 
With regard to the first element, that the leniency applicant should state 
all the facts related to the cartel promptly, the issue is whether the facts to 
be stated should include both the facts related to the leniency applicant’s 
involvement in the concerted conduct and the acknowledgement by the 
leniency applicant that such conduct was illegal. The general approach by 
the KFTC requires both. Under this circumstance, presenting a legal 
interpretation or analysis differing from the KFTC’s case examiner could 
possibly expose the leniency applicant to a risk because such interpretation 
or analysis may be viewed as non-acknowledgment of its wrongdoings, 
thereby giving rise to an argument that the leniency applicant has not 
satisfied the cooperation requirement for leniency. 
However, a more proper stance would be that, once the leniency 
applicant has fully stated all the facts related to the unfair concerted 
conduct within its knowledge, the cooperation requirement shall not be 
deemed unsatisfied even though the applicant presents legal arguments or 
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views that deviate from that of the KFTC case examiner’s. This approach is 
also supported by textual reading of the statute that the statement shall be 
made with regard to ‘facts in connection with the unfair concerted conduct’. 
The determination on whether the stated facts amount to an illegal conduct 
prohibited under the MRFTA should be solely left to the decision of the 
KFTC.19)
3. Restriction on Granting Leniency Immunity to Repeat Offenders
On December 31, 2011, the MRFTA Enforcement Decree was revised to 
deny immunity to a repeat offender that has repeatedly engaged in an 
unfair concerted conduct in violation of MRFTA Article 19, paragraph 1, 
during a certain period (MRFTA Enforcement Decree Article 35, paragraph 
1, subparagraph 1, the latter part). The KFTC Leniency Program 
Notification provides that one has repeatedly engaged in an unfair 
concerted conduct in violation of MRFTA Article 19, paragraph 1, during a 
certain period if either (i) one commits the unfair concerted conduct in 
violation of a corrective measure within five years from the date that 
corrective measures and/or fines are imposed on it for violation of MRFTA 
Article 19, paragraph 1, or (ii) one newly commits unfair concerted conduct 
in violation of MRFTA Article 19, paragraph 1, within five years from the 
date the exemption or reduction in corrective measures and/or fines for 
violation of MRFTA Article 19, paragraph 1 were granted to it pursuant to 
MRFTA Article 22-2 (KFTC Leniency Program Notification Article 6-3). 
The above requirement effectively deprives an incentive for a company 
to voluntarily report any new concerted conduct it has participated 
regardless of whether it had applied for leniency for previous cartel 
activities, so long as it has a history of being sanctioned for engaging in 
unfair concerted conduct within last five years. The legislative intent to 
eliminate cartel activities by preventing repeat offenders from taking 
advantage of the leniency program has merit in some way. Nevertheless, its 
19) For a similar opinion, see Chung Jong Chae, Dogjeomgyuje Mich Gongjeonggeolaee 
Gwanhan Beoblyulsang Jajinsingo Jedoui Jaengjeomdeul (2) [Issues from Cartel Leniency under the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (2)], 167 gyeongjaengjeoneoL [j. ComPeTiTion] 24, 39 
(2013). 
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consequence of discouraging cartel members from cooperating with the 
KFTC by leniency applications for the sole reason that they have repeatedly 
engaged in cartel activities within a certain period may be sufficient to 
question its effectiveness from the perspective of cartel enforcement. 
Moreover, whether this anti-repeat offender provision has an effect of 
preventing multiple commitment of cartel activities is not yet substantiated. 
To the contrary, some critics argue, this provision may help sustain cartel 
activities by making their nature more clandestine.20)  
4. Joint Leniency Application
Generally, leniency application for unfair concerted conduct is filed by a 
single entity.  However, the joint leniency application was introduced with 
the revision of the MRFTA on May 13, 2009. The joint leniency application 
is permitted for business entities of two or more for exceptional cases where 
the business entities are either (a) affiliated with each other under 
substantive control, or (b) parties to divestiture or business transfer, if they 
meet other elements set forth by the KFTC (MRFTA Enforcement Decree 
Article 35, paragraph 1, subparagraph A). This provision reflect the KFTC’s 
intention to allow the leniency status for a single applicant as a default 
principle, while conditionally granting the identical immunity to multiple 
parties when certain circumstances make it necessary to treat their joint 
application same with that by a single party.
Whereas the interpretation of divestiture or business transfer for the 
purpose of joint leniency is relatively clear, what it means for business 
entities ‘to be affiliated with each other under substantive control’ is 
disputable. The KFTC Leniency Program Notification states that 
substantive control exists (i) where a business entity owns the entire shares 
of stocks of another business entity (including shares owned by the same 
person or persons related to the same person; hereinafter the same shall 
apply); or (ii) where a business entity does not own the entire shares of 
stock of another business entity but has de facto control over another 
business, and thus they are not deemed to be independent of each other, 
20) Park, supra note 6, at 15.
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when such factors as the ratio of shareholdings, the business entities’ 
understanding, whether there are interlocking officers between the 
business entities, whether their accountings are consolidated, whether the 
controlling entity makes management instructions routinely, whether a 
business can independently determine terms and conditions of sales, and 
(iii) other circumstances are considered in its entirety along with the 
specific nature of each case. However, business entities are not under 
substantive control if they are deemed competitors when such factors as 
current conditions of the related market, the competitors’ understanding, 
and the businesses’ activities are considered (KFTC Leniency Program 
Notification Article 4-2).
Regarding the interpretation of substantive control, the Supreme Court 
recently held, “in consideration of the statute and the purpose of the joint 
leniency application, the meaning of substantive control should be 
narrowly construed to be applicable to a situation where one controlling 
entity solely exercises de facto control over the other business entities, 
leaving them without independence and freedom in relation to their 
decision-making processes and each business of such other entities not 
independently operated. In determining de facto control, various factors 
such as ratio of shareholdings, the controlling entity’s level of influence in 
decision-making processes, methods of participating in decision-making 
processes, whether the controlling entity makes management instructions 
routinely, whether there are interlocking officers between the business 
entities, how the entities perceive their relationship with each other, 
whether their accountings are consolidated, whether each business entity 
can independently determine its business areas or strategies, how the 
entities behave in the market, and how they came to file joint application 
should be comprehensively considered.”21)
This ruling also held that it should be possible to establish substantive 
control among business entities that are competitors in appearance if they 
can be considered as one entity in substance. This ruling is notable because 
it overturned Seoul High Court’s ruling22) that business entities are affiliated 
with each other under substantive control only if they are either a single 
21) Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2012Du13962, Sept. 24, 2015 (S. Kor.).
22) Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2010Nu32091, May 24, 2012 (S. Kor.).
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business entity in substance or can be treated as a single business entity for 
the reason that they do not compete with each other.
5. Protecting Identity of Leniency Applicants
Protecting an applicant’s identity is essential to vitalize the cartel 
leniency and improve detecting cartel activities. If the fact that a leniency 
application has been filed or the identity of a leniency applicant is easily 
released, this will not only impair the foundation of the cartel leniency 
program, which is based on confidentiality, but also will become a 
disincentive against future leniency application. The KFTC Leniency 
Program Notification require the KFTC officials in charge of the case to 
keep confidential the identity of and information obtained from a leniency 
applicant as well as evidentiary information and materials, and the KFTC to 
exercise due care in preventing the identity of leniency beneficiaries from 
being released by or to the press or otherwise.
Protecting the identity of a leniency applicant may conflict with rights to 
defense of other non-leniency respondents and their due process. Some 
argue that the current protection for leniency applicants until the KFTC 
plenary session is excessive in light of its adverse effect on the other 
respondents’ defense rights under due process, considering that the 
identity of leniency applicants will be made public at the court proceedings 
in any event and that there is no reason to help maintain credibility among 
cartel members by protecting the leniency applicant’s identity.23) However, 
disclosure of the identity of leniency applicants during the KFTC 
proceedings would cause unnecessary disputes over whether the applicant 
has satisfied all the requirements for leniency immunity. Also, considering 
that information contained in the leniency application is currently made 
available to respondents by the Examiner’s Report, disclosing the leniency 
applicant’s identity is not necessary to protect other respondent’s right to 
defense under the due process.24)
23) Park, supra note 10, at 124. 
24) Park, supra note 6, at 18.
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IV. Conclusion
The KFTC is increasingly relying on the leniency program for its anti-
cartel enforcement. This trend is understandable on the back of current 
developments where cartel members are adopting more complicated and 
diversified methods for communication, and detecting evidence for cartel 
activities becomes even more challenging as a consequence. However, as 
have been confirmed by recent cases mentioned earlier, such reliance on the 
leniency program may create unintended incentives for cartel members to 
take advantage of it by securing the immunity through opportunistic 
behaviors or abusing the leniency program as a means of retaliation against 
one’s competitors. 
Notwithstanding such side effects, it is difficult to deny the efficacy of 
the leniency program, not only in detecting existing cartels but also in 
deterring future cartel activities.  The leniency program is indispensable to 
the KFTC’s detection and investigation of cartel activities, which are by 
nature secretive. Therefore, the KFTC should continue its effort to beef up 
the leniency program by actively addressing practical issues that have been 
raised during the implementation and operation of the current leniency 
program. Additionally, it is also important that the KFTC officials in charge 
of the case should always be mindful of the truthfulness and reliability of 
statements from leniency applicants in the course of investigations in order 
to avoid undue reliance on them.

